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Abstract
I study a search-theoretic model with pairwise meetings where dealers arise endogenously. The
extent of intermediation depends on its cost, trade frictions, and the dealers’ ability to negotiate favorable terms of trade. Under Nash bargaining, there is a unique equilibrium where dealers buy and hold
the low-storage-cost good and, depending on their relative bargaining power, resell it at a premium or
a discount. The distribution of the terms of trade is non-degenerate unless storage cost and frictions
vanish. Due to an externality created by intermediation, the efficient allocation can be achieved only if
dealers can charge a positive markup.
Key Words: Search, Intermediation, Prices, Bargaining
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1. Introduction
I construct a search theoretic environment that allows endogenous determination of the number of
trade facilitators and the negotiated terms of trade. In it, mediated exchange emerges as a natural response to market frictions. I study how the incidence of intermediation responds to economic incentives linked to frictions, intermediation costs, the availability of different goods, and the ability to ne1

gotiate favorable terms of trade. I also complement work on matching models of exchange, by pointing to the implications that the absence or the type of pricing mechanism have for existence and efficiency of equilibria. I do so by proving existence of equilibria for a simple transaction pattern, of
which I characterize the terms of trade, extent of intermediation, and study the efficiency properties.
The economy is modeled in section 2, along the lines of Kiyotaki and Wright (1989). This is a
natural starting point because the model’s frictions make the role of intermediation explicit: certain
agents choose to undertake the role of dealers, costly storing a commodity they don’t consume to resell it to others. I relax the assumption of fixed terms of trade (as in Shi, 1995, and Trejos-Wright,
1995), but also of exogenous distribution of agents specialized in each consumption-production activity (as in Wright, 1995). I study the fundamental transaction pattern, where some agents engage in a
sequence of indirect trades involving only the lowest-storage-cost good. Several transaction patterns
have been shown to exist in this class of models (e.g. Kehoe et al., 1993). I focus on the fundamental
pattern for several reasons. To study the link between absence (or choice) of price mechanisms and
existence of equilibria, I can restrict attention to a single trade pattern; investigating more than one
provides little additional insight. Focusing on fundamental equilibria allows me to provide an especially clear illustration of the subject of interest by resolving an issue raised by Wright (1995). He
proves the non-existence of fundamental equilibria when agents choose their specialty production, and
the terms of trade are fixed at par. In fact, I prove existence of a continuum of ‘prices’ consistent with
a fundamental strategy. Finally, the fundamental strategy is often considered the most “natural” when
trade requires costly storage of goods. This has been suggested by studies of similar synthetic and ex2

perimental economies (Marimon et al., 1990, Brown, 1996, Duffy and Ochs, 1999).

I develop the analysis in section 3, assuming that the negotiated terms of trade satisfy a Nash bargaining protocol. In section 4, I prove that equilibria exist where dealers arise endogenously only if
their bargaining position is not extreme. When dealers are weak bargainers, they may sell at a discount
but charge a markup on their sales when they are strong negotiators. Impatient consumers are willing

1

A number of studies have focused on intermediation in bilateral search markets with fixed prices. Examples
include Rubinstein and Wolinsky (1987), Yavas (1994), Li (1998) and Shevchenko (1999).
2
In particular, Duffy and Ochs emphasize how subjects show a strong tendency to play fundamental strate-
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to pay a premium, and producers offer discounts, to someone capable of quickly satisfying their effective demand. This obtains even if search frictions vanish. I find that in equilibrium there is terms of
trade dispersion, which, however, may disappear as frictions and intermediation costs vanish (as in
Camera and Corbae, 1999). The extent of intermediation responds in an intuitive way to changes in
fundamentals. For example, as storage costs fall, more dealers arise. I also show existence of a continuum of terms of trades supporting the fundamental exchange pattern, for arbitrary price mechanisms.
Due to a trading externality generated by intermediation, however, an equilibrium is efficient only if
dealers can sell at a premium and buy at a discount. Section 5 concludes.
2. Environment
Consider a version of model A in Kiyotaki and Wright (1989), with a unit mass of ex-ante identical agents. They can produce and consume one non-storable autarkic good, good 0, with net utility
a≥0. At the beginning of life (only), agents can acquire a market production opportunity i∈N≡{1,2,3},
losing the ability to produce good 0. This allows the agent to specialize in the costly production of
market good i, that she cannot consume and whose production requires consumption of some amount
of market good i-1. Market production opportunities can be freely discarded to revert to autarkic production. Let a producer of i+1 be identified as agent (of type) i. Consumption of qi units of good i generates instantaneous utility u(qi)>0 only to agent i (zero otherwise); u(q) is strictly increasing, concave,
continuously differentiable, u(0)=0, and future utility is discounted by β∈(0,1). Production of qi+1
generates disutility γqi+1. Anyone can store one unit of good i suffering disutility ci per period,
0<c1≤c2≤c3. Storage and market production are mutually exclusive, and once good i is stored it must
be traded as an indivisible unit. Assume u(qi)- γqi>0 increasing on qi∈(0,1], let q={q1,q2,q3}, and normalize γ=u'(1). Autarkic producers stay out of the market. At each date market producers are paired
randomly and anonymously. Objects stored and type are observable in a match, trading histories are
private information and agents cannot commit themselves to future actions. If two matched agents
agree to trade, they bargain over the terms of trade. Production and consumption occur at the beginning of the following period. Let Ui=u(qi)- γqi+1 denote the net instantaneous utility derived by agent i,
if she produces qi+1 in exchange for qi.

3

gies (over others) irrespective of marketability conditions in the experimental economy.
3
Some of these features are extreme but make the model simple enough to generate clear results without
sacrificing the rigorousness of the analysis. In particular, preferences and technologies motivate the existence of
gains from specialization and trade, while storage bound and indivisibility limit the state space (see the difficul-
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3. Stationary Symmetric Fundamental Equilibrium
Consider outcomes with no autarkic production where agents only accept own consumption or the
4

lowest storage-cost good. I focus on stationary symmetric rational expectations equilibria where
agents adopt Nash strategies. The terms of trade are reached via bilateral negotiations assumed to satisfy Nash bargaining. Strategies are based on the correct evaluation of the gains from trade and are
chosen to maximize the expected lifetime utility from consumption. In equilibrium production and
trading decisions are individually optimal, given the correctly perceived strategies of others and distribution of objects, and are time-invariant and identical for individuals of identical type.
3.1 The initial choice of productive activity
Individuals initially simultaneously choose a production opportunity, taking as given the strategies
of others. Each market production is chosen by someone if it is weakly preferred to autarky and to the
remaining others. Because of the link between production and types, I interpret the choice of production as a choice over types. Let p'i∈[0,1] denote the probability that, at the beginning of life, the average individual chooses to produce good i=0,1,..3, given the choices {pi} of all others. For any j≠i, p'i=1
(∈[0,1]) if i is strictly (weakly) preferred to every j, and p'i=0 if there is some j that is strictly preferred
to i. Define a search equilibrium as an outcome where market production is strictly preferred to autarky, i.e. p0=0. Since there must be positive demand for every market commodity, it requires ex-ante
5

indifference among all market production. Thus, let p={p1,p2,p3} and p2 =1−( p1+p3); 0< pi< 1 is the
population proportion of agents i=1,2,3, who produce good i+1 and consume i.
Agent i would never store own production, due to costs, and would consume good i as soon as
possible, due to discounting (conditions are provided later). She could, however, choose to store good
i+2 if this allows her to obtain good i more frequently or at better terms of trade. Thus, at every date
agent i can be either a producer of i+1, or a dealer storing one good i+2. Let pi,j denote the proportion
of agents i who can offer some good j. Then

∑p

i,j

=1.

(1)

j∈N

Let Vi,j be agent i’s lifetime utility when she can offer good j, and Va be the autarkic lifetime util-

ties due to complex distributions of holdings in Camera and Corbae, 1999, or Shevchenko, 1999).
4
No additional insight is obtained by considering equilibria where some choose autarky.
5
Assume pi=0 for some market good i and pj >0 for j≠i. Then, autarky is at least weakly preferred to market
production i+1, since market good i is not produced. A similar conclusion holds if pi=1 for some i.

4

ity. Let E(Vi)≡

∑p

i,jVi,j

be the expected lifetime utility of agent i, unconditional on her current inven-

j∈N

tory. It may be interpreted as the ex-ante average utility for agent i, a function of the endogenous distribution of inventories {pi,j}. I say that an agent is ex-ante indifferent between becoming a type i or h
when the two expected lifetime utilities, unconditional on inventory, are identical but larger than the
6

value of autarky. In a search equilibrium agents must be indifferent across production types, when
taking as given {p,π,q}, and must strictly prefer market production to autarky; i.e. for all i,h=1,2,3

E(Vi)=E(Vh)>Va

(2)

3.2 Trading Strategies and Distributions
Focus on meetings that may lead to mutually beneficial exchange, between i and j∈{i-1,i+1}.
With probability pj pj,h agent i meets agent j who offers good h. They choose to trade taking as given

q. In a rational expectations equilibrium choices are based on the correct forecast of the negotiated
terms of trade (later discussed). Agent i in equilibrium always accepts to trade for good i, and refuses
good i+1. What must be studied is whether she enters a trade in which she expects to produce qi+1 in
exchange for one unit of good i+2 (modulo 3). Let πi'∈{0,1} denote the trading strategy of agent i
when she takes as given the strategies π={π1,π2,π3} of all others, q, p and {pi,j}. Thus, π'i is the prob7

ability of accepting one unit of good i+2 in exchange for qi+1. If the fundamental trading strategy is
played agents i=1,3 only accept own consumption, while agent 2 accepts also one unit of good 1, i.e.
π=π*≡{0, 1, 0}. Hence, when π* is an equilibrium

pi,i=p1,3=p3,2=0<p1,2=p3,1=1

(3)

for all i, while p2,3 and p2,1 are positive and must satisfy the steady-state law of motion

p2,1p1p1,2=p2,3p3p3,1
Its left hand side reflects how frequently agents 2 sell the intermediated good, and the right hand side
how frequently they buy the intermediated good from its producers. Using the law of motion and (1)

p2,1=

p3
p1 + p3

p2,3=

and

p1
.
p1 + p3

(4)

3.3 Value functions

6

While other measures are possible (for instance measuring expected utility conditional on type and current
inventory) this measure is easy to work with, and it has been previously proposed (Wright, 1995).
7
The focus on pure strategies is without loss in generality, due to divisible production. In equilibrium, agent
i's partner (agent j) must want good i+1 (if j could produce it she would not accept it, and if j=i+2 she would not

5

Suppose there exists a search equilibrium where π=π* and (1)-(4) hold, for some q. Then, the stationary value function for agent i who can offer good j, must satisfy the standard equations

V1,2=β{(p1+p3)V1,2+p2[p2,1max{U1+V1,2,V1,2}+p2,3 max {π'1(V1,3-γq2)+(1- π'1)V1,2}]}

(5)

V2,1=−c1+β{p1max{u(q2)+V2,3,V2,1}+p2V2,1+p3V2,1}

(6)

V2,3=β{p1V2,3+p2V2,3+p3 max [π'2(V2,1-γq3)+(1- π'2)V2,3]}

(7)

V3,1=β{p1 max {π'3(V3,2-γq1)+(1- π'3)V3,1}+p2[p2,3max{U3+V3,1,V3,1}+p2,1V3,1]+p3V3,1}

(8)

π '1

π '2

π '3

Equation (5) describes the expected flow return to agent 1, as a producer. With probability p1+p3 she
meets someone who does not trade with her, given the proposed π. With probability p2 p2,1 she meets a
dealer who has one unit of her consumption good. If she chooses to trade, she expects to receive q1=1
and to produce q2, with net utility U1 and continuation utility V1,2. With probability p2 p2,3 agent 1
8

meets a type 2 who is a producer, and can choose to accept and store one unit of good 3 (π'1=1). Expressions (6)-(8) have a similar interpretation, and illustrate why the terms of trade may differ across
matches. Agents 1 and 3 produce and consume simultaneously and never suffer storage costs. Agent 2,
though, produces before consuming, and endures storage costs. Thus, the harder it is to sell her inventory, the greatest is her burden. She can make these losses up by requesting discounts to producers of
the intermediated good, q3<q1=1, or charging a premium to its consumers, q2>q1=1.
3.4 Equilibrium Strategies and Negotiated Terms of Trade
Individuals choose to trade only if they expect to obtain positive surplus. I say that, given π*, q is
feasible if in equilibrium it leaves positive surplus to those who buy a consumption good. Specifically,
feasibility requires Ui>0 for i=1,3 (which, in turn, implies V1,2, V3,1>0), i.e.
q2<

u (q1 )
γ

q3> u −1 ( γq1 )

and

(9)

while in the case of agent 2
u(q2)+V2,3-V2,1>0.

(10)

Given q and π=π*, individual optimality of the trading strategy requires
π'1=0

if

V1,2>V1,3−γq2

(11)

offer good i+2). Thus, if i is indifferent to the trade, j could slightly reduce her request qi+1 to get the trade.
8

Out of equilibrium actions must take into account the proposed q. For example when agent 1 considers this
transaction, she expects to be required to produce q2 in exchange for one good 3.

6

π'2=1

if

V2,3<V2,1−γq3

(12)

π'3=0

if

V3,1>V3,2−γq1.

(13)

Contingent on having chosen to trade with someone who can offer good j, producer i and her partner bargain over the terms of trade, i.e. i's acquisition of Qj in exchange for Qi+1. Due to storage restrictions, no dealer would request more than one unit to store. Thus, in a match between agents 2 and
3, bargaining involves determination of a quantity Q3 to be produced by agent 2 in exchange for Q1=1.
In a match between agent 1 and a dealer with Q1=1, bargaining involves determination of Q2 in exchange for the dealer's inventory. The negotiated terms of trade are assumed to satisfy the solution of a
Nash bargaining problem with non-zero threat points and bargaining weight θ∈(0,1) to the dealer.

9

Given q and Q1=q1=1, {Q2,Q3} solves

max [V2,3+u(Q2)-V2,1]θ[u(1)-γQ2](1- θ)
Q2

and

max [V2,1−γQ3−V2,3]θ[u(Q3)-γ](1- θ)
Q3

subject to (9)-(10) and (12), since surpluses must be positive; {Q2, Q3} satisfies Nash bargaining if

u(Q2) + V2,3 − V2,1 = [u(1)- γQ2]
V2,1 − γQ3 − V2,3 = [u(Q3)- γ]

θu ' (Q2 )
(1 − θ) γ

(14)

θγ
(1 − θ)u ' (Q3 )

(15)

The left hand sides show the trade surplus to the dealer. Her customer’s trade surplus is on the right
hand side, ‘weighted’ by relative bargaining power, and the ratio of marginal utility from consumption
to marginal cost of production. Note that by construction the total surplus in each match is maximized
when trades occur at par, Q2=Q3=1, since u'(1)=γ.

10

In a symmetric equilibrium (9)-(10), (12), and

Q=q must also be satisfied. Since q1=1, then q2 is the real price offered by the dealer (the “ask” price)
and q3 the real price paid by the dealer (the “bid” price) to, respectively, consumers and producers of
the intermediated good. Thus, q2/q3 -1 can be taken to measure the real markup.
A rational expectations symmetric stationary equilibrium is a set of value functions, strategies, distributions, and terms of trade, such that agents maximize expected lifetime utility, the distribution is
stationary, and the terms of trade satisfy the assumed pricing rule, are feasible, and consistent with
storing restrictions. That is, {Vi,j} satisfy (5)-(8), {p',π'}={p,π} satisfy (2) and (11)-(13), {pi,j} satisfy

9

While I do not model explicitly the bilateral bargaining process, this may be seen as implementing a solution to a more structured game (see for example Trejos and Wright, 1995).
10
The two total surpluses are u(Q2)−γQ2 +u(1)−V2,1+V2,3 and u(Q3)−γQ3 +γ+V2,1−V2,3.

7

(3) and (4), and q=Q satisfies (9)-(10), q1=1, and (14)-(15).
4. Existence and Characterization

To prove existence of the fundamental equilibrium I check that, given {p,π,q}, (i) no agent prefers
autarky, (ii) the strategy π* is individually optimal, and (iii) there is at least a fixed point
{Q2,Q3}={q2,q3} to the map defined by (14)-(15), given q1=1. Requirement (i) is satisfied for a>0 sufficiently small, which I henceforth assume. The strategy π* is individually optimal if (11)-(13) hold.
Given a feasible q, the value functions associated to out-of-equilibrium actions, are

V1,3={−c3+βp3[u(q1)+V1,2]}/[1-β(p1+p2)],
when agent 1 has accepted (and now stores) one unit of commodity 3, and

V3,2={−c2+βp2p2,3[u(q3)+V3,1]}/[1-β(p1+p2p2,1+p3)],
when agent 3 has one unit of commodity 2. A lemma follows (all proofs in appendix).

Lemma 1. Let π=π*. Given q, p, and {pij}, then π* is individually optimal iff
c3>β(p3−p2p2,1)U1−γq2(1-β)

(16)

c1<βp1u(q2)−γq3[1-β(1-p1)]

(17)

in which case (9) is sufficient for q to be feasible.
Given q, dealers of good 1 can endogenously arise if the return to intermediation is sufficiently
large. Two components affect it. One is the storage cost c1, that can’t be too large. The other is linked
to the extent of trade frictions, captured by β, and the demand for the intermediated commodity, specified by p1. Great impatience and infrequent sales of intermediated goods (low β and p1) contribute to
increase the expected length of storage, hence raise the dealer's losses and reduce her expected utility
from future consumption. Thus agent 2 would elect to not store good 1 if β or p1 are too low, even in
the absence of storage costs.
Given π=π*, stationary {pij}, and a feasible q, I can now characterize the endogenous distribution

p. Since all market commodities must be produced in a search equilibrium, I look for a mixed strategy
p'=p=p*. The following lemma shows that p* is unique: in equilibrium every individual selects ex-ante
to become type i with identical probability pi*.

Lemma 2. Let {pij} satisfy (3)-(4), π=π*, and q be feasible. There is a unique p* that satisfies (2),
8

where p1*=

U
βU 1 + c1
, p3*=p1* 3 , p2*=1−( p1*+p3*), and pi*∈(0,1) ∀i.
β(U 1 + U 2 + U 3 )
U1

The initial choice of type is a function of storage cost and discount factor, but also of expected
terms of trade and the transaction pattern. As storage costs grow the return to intermediation falls and
indifference requires more frequent matches with consumers of the intermediated good. This decreases
the duration of storage and increases the dealer's frequency of consumption. Thus, given q, p1* and p3*
increase with c1, and p2* falls. Similar considerations apply to a decrease in β or q2: more impatience
and less consumption make intermediation less attractive. Note that pi* converges to 1/3 for all i (as in
Kiyotaki and Wright, 1989) as c1→0, and only if all trades occur at par, qi=1 ∀i. The next lemma describes the properties of the equilibrium terms of trade, q*.

Lemma 3. Let π=π*, and p=p*. If a feasible q* is a fixed point of (14)-(15), then it has the following properties: (i) it cannot exist unless θ∈(θL,θH), 0<θL<θH<1, and if it exists it is unique; (ii) both

q2* and q3* fall in c1 and rise in β, while q2* rises and q3* falls in θ; (iii) if θ∈(θM,θH) then q2*>q3* and
q3*<1, θL<θM=1/3; (iv) trades occur at par if and only if θ=θM, c1→0, and β→1; (v) q2*/q3* increases
in c1 and decreases in β if q3* is small, and the opposite occurs if q3* is large.
Suppose q=q* is an equilibrium. A lower storage cost (or lower frictions) increases the return to a
dealer. This creates stronger incentives for intermediation, p2 rises, and allows dealers to offer better
terms of trade to producers, q3 rises. These factors spur production of good 1, p3 rises. The resulting
fall in p1, however, lowers the dealer’s probability of consumption. She counteracts it by asking for
more, q2 grows. The relative size of q2 and q3 depends on the bargaining powers. When the dealer’s
bargaining position is weak, θL<θ≤θM, she might sell intermediated goods at a discount (if the storage
cost is small) and may also be able to buy them at discount (if θ is not too low). When the dealer’s
bargaining position is strong, θM<θ<θH, she always buys at a discount, q3<1, and sells at a premium,

q2>q3. This results even if dealers have the weaker negotiating position (since θM=1/3) or if discounting and storage costs are negligible. The markup charged responds in intuitive ways to changes in parameters. In particular, if dealers have been asking steep discounts to producers, q3 low, the markup is
eased as frictions and costs fall (q2/q3 -1 falls).
9

If an equilibrium exists, it is generally characterized by terms of trade dispersion, due to heterogeneity in consumption frequencies. Since pi≠pj unless c1=0, the terms of trade need to adjust to support
ex-ante indifference between economic activities. The total surplus is maximized in each match only if
θ=θM, as frictions and intermediation cost vanish. In that case every transaction occurs at par. This is

so because, when qi=1, p becomes a uniform distribution as c1→0, in which case dealers transact twice
as frequently as anyone else. This provides a rationale for why the dealers’ relative bargaining power,
θM/(1-θM), must be half that of their customers. Discounting must be negligible since dealers always

produce prior to consumption. Conditions sufficient for existence of an equilibrium are next provided,
using βL∈(0,1) and cH,cL>0 (functions of the model’s parameters).

Proposition 1. Let a>0 small, c3>cL and θL<θ<θH. If βL<β<1 and c1<cH, then a unique search
equilibrium {p*,π*,q*} exists. The equilibrium {p*,π*} is also supported by pricing mechanisms that
generate terms of trade close to q*.
The model illustrates why the absence of a pricing mechanism has consequences for existence of
equilibria. When the distribution is endogenous, it is the inability of bargaining over better terms of
trade that rules out the fundamental equilibrium (as in Wright, 1995). Indeed, when negotiations are
allowed, there is a continuum of terms of trade that support it. Its existence depends also on the pricing
mechanism adopted. For instance, take-it-or-leave-it offers, θ=0,1, cannot support it since surpluses
from trade must be bounded away from zero. Under Nash bargaining and θ>θH, the dealer charges
steep prices to her customers; thus, very few would choose to be one, p1,p3≈0. The opposite is true if
θ<θL, when few would choose to be intermediaries, p2≈0. In both of these cases some agents either get

very little surplus frequently or some surplus very infrequently.
When is a decentralized allocation efficient? I answer the question by considering the outcome
due to a planner who, taking as given the exchange arrangement, chooses the terms of trade to maxi3

mize social welfare W(q2,q3)=

∑ p E[V (q , q )] , i.e. the ex-ante expected utility of an agent.11
i

i

2

3

i =1

Proposition 2. Let {p*,π*} be an equilibrium. The welfare-maximizing q is such that q3<1<q2.

11

Thus, I am not asking whether the fundamental trading pattern is the best way to organize exchange. Storage of other goods by other agents might increase the average consumption frequency and be welfare improving.

10

The planner would let dealers charge a markup because they provide a positive trade externality.
Intermediation facilitates consumption through indirect trades. An insufficient number of dealers reduces the consumption frequency of some (the dealer’s customers), while an excessive number diminishes the dealers’ ability to consume. Dealers also economize on societal use of resources by holding
the cheapest inventory. Thus, in general there is a ‘desirable’ interior intermediation level that generates maximum average lifetime utility, for the given pattern of exchange. To gain intuition, abstract
from the cost saving aspect by letting c1>0 small, and consider β close to 1 and θ=θM. Here the decentralized equilibrium involves the exchange of the surplus-maximizing quantity qi=1, but there is underprovision of intermediation, with agents (almost) equally distributed across economic tasks. The
planner can raise the average frequency of consumption by inducing a greater number of dealers to
arise through discounts on their inventory acquisitions and extra consumption on their purchases.
5. Concluding Remarks

I have illustrated a general equilibrium model with pairwise trades, where dealers arise endogenously to mediate the sale of a good whose price is negotiated. I have done so by relaxing the assumptions of exogenous distribution and fixed prices in a prototypical search-theoretic model. I have
proved existence of a unique equilibrium for a simple transaction pattern, when the negotiated terms of
trade satisfy Nash bargaining. In equilibrium extent of intermediation and the terms of trade are fully
flexible and respond in intuitive ways to changes in economic fundamentals. For example, more dealers arise as their relative bargaining position strengthens or storage costs fall. The distribution of the
terms of trade is non-degenerate, but trades may occur at par if frictions and storage costs vanish. I
have shown that the choice of pricing mechanism has implications for efficiency of equilibria. Due to
an externality created by intermediation, the efficient allocation can be achieved only if dealers are
able to charge a markup.
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Appendix

Proof of Lemma 1. Use π=π* in (5)-(8) to rearrange the inequalities in (11) and (12) as (16) and
(17), respectively; (13) is always satisfied. When q2<qH =u(1)/γ and q3>qL=u-1(γ) then (9) is satisfied,
and (10) holds since U2>0 (true when π2=1). Thus, if π* is an equilibrium, q2<qH and q3>qL guarantee
feasibility of q. Note that qH>1>qL>0 because of the assumptions made.■
Proof of Lemma 2. Let {pij} satisfy (3)-(4), π=π*, q2<qH, q3>qL, and a>0 small. Use (5)-(8) in (2)
for i=1,2,3. Then, V1,2−V3,1=0, if p3*=p1

U3
βU 1 + c1
∈(0,1), since
>0; V1,2−E[V2]=0 if p1*=
U1
β(U 1 + U 2 + U 3 )

U1>0 and c1<βU2 when π=π* (by Lemma 1). Thus, p2*=1−(p1*+p3*)∈(0,1) since p1*+p3*<1 if
c1<

β U 1U 2
, holding since (17) holds (seen by substituting p1* in it). It is obvious that p1*+p3*>0.■
U1 + U 3
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Proof of Lemma 3. Let a>0 small, π=π*, p=p*, given q. Q=q must be feasible, thus restrict attention to Q2<qH, Q3>qL, Q1 =1. Q satisfies (14)-(15) if f(Q2,θ)=g(Q3,θ)=∆(Q2,Q3,c1)>0,where
∆(·)≡V2,1−V2,3, f(·)≡u(Q2)−[u(1)- γQ2]

θu ' (Q2 )
θγ
, and g(·)≡γQ3+[u(Q3)- γ]
; fQ and gQ are
2
3
(1 − θ)u ' (Q3 )
(1 − θ) γ

positive

Q3=Q2=1),

(and

equal

only

at

gθ>0>fθ,

f(Qi,θ)<g(Qi,θ)=∞

as

Qi→∞,

and

f(Qi,θ)=−∞<g(Qi,θ)=0 as Qi→0. ∃ θH∈(0,1) such that f(qH,θ)>g(qL) only if θ<θH. Thus, a root
Q2=h(Q3,θ) to f(Q2,θ)−g(Q3,θ)=0 exists only if θ<θH. The root is unique, and h is a strictly increasing,
continuous and invertible function. If θ>θM=1/3 then f lays below g for all feasible Q3, i.e.
qL<Q3< Q3 ≡h-1(qH), and are tangent at Q2=Q3=1 when θ=θM. If θ∈(θM, θH) then Q2=h(Q3,θ)>Q3 for
all feasible Q3. If θ∈(0, θM) then Q2<Q3 if Q3 is close to 1, since f is concave in Q2. Finally, if
Q2=h(Q3,θ) then Q2 increases and Q3 decreases in θ, since gθ>0>fθ, while U2≥0.

Let θ<θH, Q3∈(qL, Q3 ), Q2=h(Q3,θ); ∆(Q3,θ,c1)=

− c1 + β[ p1u (Q2 ) + p3 γQ3 ]
positive if (17) holds.
1 − βp 2

∃ θL∈(0,θM) such that ∆(Q3,θ,c1)≤g(Q3) if θ≤θL, since if θ=0 then ∆(·)−g(·)∝−c1−γQ3(1−β)<0. Thus

let θL<θ<θH. Rewrite (17) as
c1<c1(Q3) ≡

βU 1U 2 − γQ3 (1 − β)(U 1 + U 2 + U 3 )
U1 + U 3

where c1(Q3)>0 if β>β(Q3)≡

U 1 γQ3 + γQ3 (U 2 + U 3 )
, β(Q3)≤1 iff Q3≤ Q3 . Define cH=c1(qL) and
U 1u (h(Q3 )) + γQ3 (U 2 + U 3 )

βL=β(qL). If Q3= Q3 (17) is violated ∀c1>0, which implies ∆( Q3 ,θ,c1)< γ Q3 <g( Q3 ,θ). If Q3=qL (17)

is satisfied iff β∈(βL,1) and c1∈(0,cH), which implies ∆(qL,θ,c1)>γqL=g(qL) (since θ>θL). Let
β∈(βL,1) and c1∈(0,cH). Since gQ >0 and ∆( Q3 ,θ,c1)< g(Q3,θ)< ∆(qL,θ,c1), by the intermediate value
3

theorem it follows that there exists a fixed point q3*∈(qL, Q3 ) such that g(q3*,θ)=∆(q3*,θ,c1). The
fixed point is unique. If not, this would imply that d2∆(Q3,θ,c1)/dQ32 must switch sign at least twice as
Q3 increases. This is not possible since it can be shown that the second partial in Q3 is monotone.

Thus, let q*={1,h(q3*,θ),q3*}. Fix Q. ∆c <0 since a maximum of d∆(Q3,θ,c1)/dc1 is proportional to
1

−1+βp'1U2<0. Since g(Q3,θ) is independent of β and c1, then q3* (and q2*) fall in c1. ∆β>0 hence q3*

(and q2*) increase in β.
Let θ∈(θM, θH). I show q3*<1 by letting c1=0 and β=1, since q3* falls in c1 and rises in β. Suppose
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Q3=1<Q2=h(1). Then ∆(1,θ,0)−g(1,θ) is p1u(Q2)+p3γ+p2[γ+U3θ/(1-θ)]−γ−U3θ/(1-θ)<0, since the least

stringent case is Q2=1 rearranged as θ/(1-θ)>1/2 (holding since θ>θM). Hence, ∆(Q3,θ,0)<g(Q3,θ)
when Q3=1. Since gQ >0 and gθ>0 then q3*<1, and q2*>q3* even if β→1 and c1→0. Now let θ=θM,
3
c1>0 and β<1: Q2=h(1)=1 since f(1,θM)=g(1,θM). Then, ∆(1,θM,c1)=g(1,θM) is −2c1= [u(1)+γ](1−β),

satisfied only in the limit, as c1→0 and β→1.
In equilibrium f(Q2,θ)-g(Q3,θ)=0, a constant. Taking its total differential it’s easy to see that
dQ2/dQ3>0 for all θ∈(θL, θH), dQ2/dQ3<1 if Q3 is sufficiently close to qL, and dQ2/dQ3>1 if Q3 is

sufficiently close to Q3 . Since d(Q2/Q3)/dQ3=d(Q2/Q3)Q3−Q2, we conclude that Q2/Q3 is increasing
in c1 and decreasing in β, if Q3 is sufficiently close to qL.
Proof Proposition1. Let p=p*, q=q*; (16) is satisfied if c3>cL≡u(1)−γh(qL). Using lemmas 1-3, π* is
an equilibrium for a>0 small, by continuity. Since (16)-(17) are strict inequalities, there are q in a
neighborhood of q* capable of supporting {p*,π*}, generated by arbitrary pricing mechanisms.■
Proof of Proposition 2. In equilibrium W(q3,q2)=E[Vi(q3,q2)]=E[Vj(q3,q2)] ∀i≠j, hence let W(·) be
given by E[V1(q3,q2)]≡V1,2(q3,q2)=

βU 3
U1
−p1). Note that W(qL,q2)=0≥W(q3, qH); U3 is con(
1 − β U1 + U 3

cave in q3 with maximum at q3=1; p1 is convex in q3 with minimum at q3=1 but it decreases in q2;
U1/(U1+U3) falls in q2 and q3. Thus, there is an interior maximum W(q3,q2)>W(1,1). It is easy to verify

that W(q3,q2) falls in q3 and rises in q2, when q3=q2=1. Thus, q2>1>q3 maximizes W(q3,q2).■
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